whether it is a prime source of origin of South African law has been contentious, due to a curious tension between statute law and common law that existed under parliamentary sovereignty. Courts, deferring to parliament as sovereign law-maker, endeavoured to give meticulous effect to the intention of the supreme legislature, often treating long established precepts of the common law with disdain in order to give optimum effect to apartheid laws. In areas (rightly or wrongly) regarded as "politically non-controversial", statute law was, however, also treated as an exception to the common law and the former was construed restrictively vis-à-vis precepts and principles of the latter.
This state of affairs has, however, been changing since the advent of constitutional democracy. But even in instances where legislation has been held to trump the common law, the interpretive paradox that common-law canons of construction are relied on to interpret such legislation, has by and large remained, though, generally speaking, constitutionally informed canons of con-6 Constitutional review is, of course, only possible by virtue of the supremacy of the Constitution proclaimed in s 2. The Constitution is not self-executing and s 2 merely creates the potential of unconstitutionality. Only intervention by a competent court or organ of state can result the amendment, repeal or striking-down of legislation. derived from the supreme Constitution). Statutes are therefore construed to be valid and of effect rather than invalid and of no effect.
I briefly want to deal with three features of our system of constitutional review that have not only preserved, but have in actual fact also enhanced the status and stature of legislation and have assigned to it an unprecedented role as a source of law in our constitutional democracy. These factors are, first, the court's exercise of constitutional review with restraint; second, the fact that statutes of a certain kind have become crucial allies of the Constitution, and, third, the enhancement of quality popular participation in legislative deliberation.
Constitutional review and judicial self-restraint
Certain reading strategies and remedial measures have been designed to help ensure that the constitutional review of legislation proceeds with circumspection. Interpretation in conformity with the Constitution -sometimes also referred to as "the presumption of constitutionality"
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-is an example of a reading strategy in this category.
A prima facie unconstitutional (and by that token potentially impugnable) provision is to survive constitutional scrutiny if it can -through the adaption of its language, if so required -be read to be constitutional without distorting it or straining its "plain meaning".
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Such a reading can be either narrower or more restrictive than other possible 8
In the case of original legislation.
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In the case of delegated legislation. Section 9(4), for instance, obliges the national legislature to enact legislation "to prevent or prohibit unfair discrimination" while section 33(3), also in a mandatory manner, enjoins the national legislature to enact legislation to give specific effect to rights and procedures associated with just administrative action. (PAJA) were enacted to comply with the constitutional obligations in sections 9(4) and 33(3) respectively.
The Labour Relations Act 17 (LRA) was enacted "to give effect to and regulate the fundamental rights conferred by section 27" of the interim Constitution, but section 27 neither explicitly required nor envisaged legislation amplifying and giving more concrete effect to it. Sections 23 (5) and (6) Section 4 of PAJA, in a similar way, provides for public participation in the making of delegated legislation.
28
Duly putting any legislation in the process of adoption through its paces of public participation, greatly enhances its eventual status and stature as a source of law. Just imagine that legislation herself was the Cinderella in Eskridge's story, then we here in South Africa might, from bitter experience, warn: "Watch her! Tame her -lest she grows up to become an angry and vengeful Amazon!" We have seen a form of social engineering in this country -Apartheid was its name -which would have been impossible without…legislation! And now we are rebuilding our country and transforming our society and its institutions, and in the course of it all legislation is coming strongly to the fore! So what are we heading for? A post-apartheid Amazon?
I trust not. The Amazon of Apartheid grew under and drew her strength from the sovereignty of a biased minority parliament. Present day legislation is heading for its heyday, but under the discipline, guidance and authority of a supreme Constitution. I would suggest that all of us working with legislation should carry this message further, and canvass its implications. I trust that this note has planted but a tiny seedling to this effect.
30
Waldron Dignity of Legislation 1.
31
